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CYBER BABEL:  FINDING THE LINGUA FRANCA 
IN CYBERSECURITY REGULATION 
William Pierotti* 
 
Cybersecurity regulations have proliferated over the past few years as the 
significance of the threat has drawn more attention.  With breaches making 
headlines, the public and their representatives are imposing requirements on 
those that hold sensitive data with renewed vigor.  As high-value targets that 
hold large amounts of sensitive data, financial institutions are among the 
most heavily regulated.  Regulations are necessary.  However, regulations 
also come with costs that impact both large and small companies, their 
customers, and local, national, and international economies.  As the 
regulations have proliferated so have those costs.  The regulations will 
inevitably and justifiably diverge where different governments view the needs 
of their citizens differently.  However, that should not prevent regulators 
from recognizing areas of agreement. 
This Note examines the regulatory regimes governing the data and 
cybersecurity practices of financial institutions implemented by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the New York Department of 
Financial Services, and the General Data Protection Regulations of the 
European Union to identify areas where requirements overlap, with the goal 
of suggesting implementations that promote consistency, clarity, and cost 
reduction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
My name is Legion:  for we are many. 
—Mark 5:91 
After Yahoo! disclosed two cyberbreaches, Verizon lowered its offer to 
purchase Yahoo! by $350 million—from $4.83 billion to $4.48 billion.2  This 
represented a 7 percent decrease in value.  With over one billion 
compromised accounts, the Yahoo! breach was massive.3  It is significant, 
however, that the compromised information took the form of email 
addresses, names, telephone numbers, and dates of birth.4  The Equifax 
breach affected roughly 143 million Americans, and the data exposed 
arguably included more sensitive information, such as Social Security and 
credit card numbers.5  While the ultimate outcome of the Equifax breach 
remains uncertain and the company has regained some of its lost value,6 the 
 
 1. Mark 5:9 (King James). 
 2. Ingrid Lunden, After Data Breaches, Verizon Knocks $350M Off Yahoo Sale, Now 
Valued at $4.48B, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 21, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/21/verizon-
knocks-350m-off-yahoo-sale-after-data-breaches-now-valued-at-4-48b/ [https://perma.cc/ 
5YVL-MF3F]. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Kate Conger, Yahoo Discloses Hack of 1 Billion Accounts, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 
14, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/12/14/yahoo-discloses-hack-of-1-billion-accounts/ 
[https://perma.cc/AZ75-ESB7]. 
 5. Michelle Fox, Equifax Will Not Survive Fallout from Massive Breach, Says 
Technology Attorney, CNBC (Sept. 14, 2017, 7:01 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/09/14/ 
equifax-will-not-survive-fallout-from-massive-breach-says-technology-attorney.html 
[https://perma.cc/YVE5-CLGV]. 
 6. Wayne Duggan, Equifax Stock May Be OK, After All, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 10, 2017, 
7:17 AM), https://money.usnews.com/investing/stock-market-news/articles/2017-11-10/ 
equifax-inc-efx-stock-earnings-data-breach [https://perma.cc/EYR5-47YX]. 
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initial market loss was $4 billion.7  That represents a 20 percent decrease in 
market value.8  The actual costs of the breach, even if the stock regains value 
and after insurance coverage kicks in, have been estimated at $200 to $300 
million.9 
Breaches10 represent a significant threat to businesses and consumers.11  
Businesses that hold sensitive information about their consumers, such as 
financial institutions, make tempting targets for cybercriminals.12  The cost 
of a breach, per record lost or stolen, at a financial institution is also higher 
than in most other industries.13  Because these institutions need to remain 
connected to the internet, it is likely impossible for them to fully prevent 
intrusions.14  Given this reality, the focus has been on what should be 
required of these institutions to limit the risk, mitigate the damage, and notify 
their consumers.15 
As a result of the importance of the issue and the multijurisdictional 
significance of these institutions, a number of government organizations and 
agencies have addressed these questions.16  While goals are similar, 
 
 7. Paul J. Lim, Equifax’s Massive Data Breach Has Cost the Company $4 Billion So 
Far, TIME (Sept. 12, 2017), http://time.com/money/4936732/equifaxs-massive-data-breach-
has-cost-the-company-4-billion-so-far/ [https://perma.cc/M97T-5WTN]. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. PONEMON INST., 2017 COST OF DATA BREACH STUDY:  GLOBAL OVERVIEW 7 (June 
2017), https://www-01.ibm.com/common/ssi/cgi-bin/ssialias?htmlfid=SEL03130WWEN 
[https://perma.cc/BM6D-RWXQ] (defining a breach “as an event in which an individual’s 
name and a medical record and/or a financial record or debit card is potentially put at risk—
either in electronic or paper format”). 
 11. See Stacy Cowley, FBI Director:  Cybercrime Will Eclipse Terrorism, CNN (Mar. 2, 
2012, 7:55 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/03/02/technology/fbi_cybersecurity/ 
[https://perma.cc/YS59-AFK4]; Stephanie Palmer-Derrien, “No Greater Threat” Than 
Cyber, Says SIFMA, ASSETSERVICINGTIMES (Nov. 2, 2017), 
http://www.assetservicingtimes.com/assetservicesnews/article.php?article_id=7741 
[https://perma.cc/RFK5-J5QC] (“Testifying before the US House of Representatives 
committee on financial services subcommittee hearing on data security, [president and CEO 
of the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association Kenneth] Bentsen said:  ‘There 
is likely no greater threat to financial stability than a large-scale cyber event.’”). 
 12. Palmer-Derrien, supra note 11; Larry Zelvin, Director, Nat’l Cybersecurity & 
Commc’ns Integration Ctr., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Remarks at U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission Cybersecurity Roundtable 28 (Mar. 26, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/ 
spotlight/cybersecurity-roundtable/cybersecurity-roundtable-transcript.txt [https://perma.cc/ 
A6JL-Y46R]. 
 13. PONEMON INST., supra note 10, at 5 (“Certain industries have more costly data 
breaches.  The average global cost of data breach per lost or stolen record was $141.  However, 
health care organizations had an average cost of $380 and in financial services the average 
cost was $245.”). 
 14. See generally Cowley, supra note 11 (“There are only two types of companies:  those 
that have been hacked, and those that will be.  Even that is merging into one category:  those 
that have been hacked and will be again . . . .”). 
 15. Bhashit (Sheek) Shah, SEC Increases Focus on Cyber Incident Response, REED SMITH 
LLP (Aug. 6, 2017), https://www.technologylawdispatch.com/2017/08/privacy-data-
protection/sec-increases-focus-on-cyber-incident-response/ [http://perma.cc/7Y3Z-PMUB]. 
 16. Id. 
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implementations have varied.17  These variations could unintentionally divert 
resources from expenditures on security towards understanding and 
administering compliance programs.18  Industry representatives emphasize 
the importance of cybersecurity in the financial sector.19  However, they also 
present a troubling figure, with firms “report[ing] that approximately 40 
percent of corporate cybersecurity activities are compliance-oriented rather 
than security-oriented.”20  Regulatory bodies could mitigate this issue by 
acknowledging areas of overlap and working together to define common 
standards.21  Currently, each covered entity must perform this analysis 
independently at substantial cost, regardless of size or availability of 
resources, with limited exceptions.22  Regulatory bodies should diminish 
areas of uncertainty and facilitate more efficient allocations of resources by 
identifying and aligning similar requirements. 
This is particularly important with regard to financial institutions, as they 
are part of the critical infrastructure of the United States23 and the European 
Union (EU).24  In the United States, critical infrastructure has been defined 
as systems that are so vital to the United States that their “incapacity or 
destruction . . . would have a debilitating impact on security, national 
 
 17. See generally Allison Grande, Cybersecurity Policy to Watch for the Rest of 2017, 
LAW360 (July 12, 2017, 7:47 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/937323/cybersecurity-
policy-to-watch-for-the-rest-of-2017 [https://perma.cc/8PJ2-PZWJ]. 
 18. Palmer-Derrien, supra note 11; see also Michael Krimminger et al., New York 
Cybersecurity Regulations for Financial Institutions Enter into Effect, CLEARY GOTTLIEB 
STEEN & HAMILTON LLP (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/-/media/organize-
archive/cgsh/files/publication-pdfs/alert-memos/alert-memo-201729.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JQ8W-5S4L]. 
 19. Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association et al., Comment Letter on New 
York Department of Financial Services’ Proposed Rulemaking on Cybersecurity 
Requirements for Financial Services Companies 2 (Nov. 14, 2016) [hereinafter SIFMA 
Comment Letter], https://www.aba.com/Advocacy/commentletters/Documents/SIFMA-NY-
DFS-Proposed-Cyber-Requirements.pdf [http://perma.cc/4YXA-97KF] (stating that 
“[c]ybersecurity remains a top priority for the financial industry,” with “investments that can 
run as high as $500 million per year for the largest firms”); see also Bhargav Mitra & Robert 
McCausland, How Identity Data Is Turning Toxic for Big Companies, CONVERSATION (Dec. 
4, 2017, 4:05 AM), https://theconversation.com/how-identity-data-is-turning-toxic-for-big-
companies-88436 [http://perma.cc/JAY5-E5WP] (“One report has found that banks spent 
nearly US$100 billion on compliance in 2016 and the global spending on meeting the 
regulatory requirements increased from 15% to 25% over the previous four years.  This 
skyrocketing spend on compliance leaves little room for product development.”). 
 20. SIFMA Comment Letter, supra note 19, at 2. 
 21. See generally PRIVACY BRIDGES:  EU AND US PRIVACY EXPERTS IN SEARCH OF 
TRANSATLANTIC PRIVACY SOLUTIONS (2015) [hereinafter PRIVACY BRIDGES], 
https://privacybridges.mit.edu/sites/default/files/documents/PrivacyBridges-FINAL.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/46CS-MY33]. 
 22. See Mitra & McCausland, supra note 19 (“[P]urchasing the technology to adhere to 
the GDPR standards . . . will cost Fortune 500 companies on average US$1m each.  Add to 
this the costs of permanent staffing and legal advice for this compliance, you get the picture 
of overall spending required for one set of regulatory standards.”). 
 23. 42 U.S.C. § 5195c (2012). 
 24. European Commission Memorandum MEMO/06/477, European Programme for 
Critical Infrastructure Protection (Dec. 12, 2006). 
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economic security, national public health or safety.”25  Similarly, the EU has 
defined them as systems that are “essential for the maintenance of vital 
societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of 
people” such that there would be a significant impact if they were destroyed 
or degraded.26  Given the significance of the financial sector, it is crucial to 
regulate in a way that furthers the enunciated security goals as effectively as 
possible.  Compliance with cybersecurity regulations should promote better 
cybersecurity, not unnecessary expenditures on understanding byzantine 
regulatory regimes.  Clarifying where the myriad and opaque obligations 
created by various regulatory schemes overlap and can be satisfied through a 
single action or process would help accomplish this extremely important goal 
and would also ensure that resources are actually used to improve 
cybersecurity.  The regulatory bodies that propagated those regulations are 
best situated to do so. 
This Note examines three bodies charged with regulating in this area:  the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), New York Department of 
Financial Services (NYDFS), and EU.  Part I provides an overview of the 
current regulatory landscape.  Part II identifies similar or associated 
requirements that provide an opportunity for standardization or clarification.  
Part III explores the benefits of coordination, recommends mechanisms the 
regulatory bodies could use to coordinate, and applies them to the areas 
identified in Part II. 
I.  THE CURRENT CYBERSECURITY REGULATORY LANDSCAPE 
Part I of this Note provides a baseline explanation of which entities are 
affected by each regulatory regime, how the regulations developed, what 
compliance with the regulations entails, and a discussion of what some of the 
potential ramifications of the regulations are.  Part I.A discusses the 
regulations, guidance, and other materials that have been disseminated by 
three regulatory bodies, the SEC, NYDFS, and EU, to determine what 
measures they expect covered entities to take.  Part I.B explores the costs of 
compliance, providing insights into the effects these regulations have and 
current trends in the financial industry that may be influenced by these 
regulations. 
A.  Where We Are in Cyberregulation and How We Got Here 
Part I.A provides an outline of the three regulatory regimes, particularly 
regarding their jurisdiction, evolution, and a broad explanation of their 
requirements.  Part I.A begins with the SEC requirements, proceeds to the 
NYDFS regulations, and concludes with the EU’s General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR). 
 
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e). 
 26. Council Directive 2008/114, art. 2, 2008 O.J. (L 345) 75, 77 (EC). 
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1.  Putting the SEC in Security 
On November 13, 2000, the SEC’s “safeguards rule,” which established 
appropriate standards for the protection of customer information at financial 
institutions, came into effect.27  Since the SEC has jurisdiction over 
investment advisers,28 brokers,29 dealers,30 and investment companies,31 all 
entities that are characterized as such are subject to the safeguards rule.32  
Further, any financial institutions that engage in these activities, such as some 
banks, must evaluate whether they are subject to the SEC’s jurisdiction and, 
if so, must comply with this regulation.33 
In 2005 the safeguards rule was updated to require covered entities to 
create and implement “written policies and procedures” that contemplate 
“administrative, technical, and physical safeguards” for the purposes of 
protecting customer information.34  These policies must be “reasonably 
designed” to accomplish three goals with regard to customer data:  
(1) provide for the data’s security and confidentiality; (2) protect the data 
from anticipated threats; and (3) prevent unauthorized access to or use of the 
data that could cause substantial harm or inconvenience.35 
For a decade after promulgating these regulations, the SEC only brought 
three enforcement actions based on the cybersecurity measures implemented 
by covered entities.  The first enforcement action was brought against the 
LPL Financial Corporation after it suffered a breach that resulted in third-
party trading and attempts to trade on several customer accounts.36  In this 
action, the SEC established that written policies must be sufficient.37  The 
SEC stated that LPL’s written policies were limited, insufficient, and failed 
to address the administrative, technical, and physical safeguards discussed 
above.38  The SEC also noted that LPL disregarded the regulatory 
 
 27. 17 C.F.R. § 248.18(a) (2018). 
 28. STAFF OF THE INV. ADVISER REGULATION OFFICE DIV. OF INV. MGMT., U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS BY THE U.S. SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 1 (2013), https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_investman/ 
rplaze-042012.pdf [http://perma.cc/R2BG-GATQ] (defining investment advisers to include 
“[m]oney managers, investment consultants, and financial planners”). 
 29. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A) (2012) (defining brokers to include individuals who 
professionally effect securities transactions on behalf of others). 
 30. Id. § 78c(a)(5)(A) (defining dealers to include individuals who professionally buy or 
sell securities on their own behalf). 
 31. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A) (2012) (defining an investment company as an issuer that 
“is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the 
business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities”). 
 32. 17 C.F.R. § 248.1(b). 
 33. Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/divisionsmarketregbdguidehtm.html 
[http://perma.cc/CDK2-28AA] (last modified Dec. 12, 2016) (“[B]anks that buy and sell 
securities must consider whether they are ‘dealers’ under the federal securities laws.”). 
 34. 17 C.F.R. § 248.30(a). 
 35. Id. 
 36. LPL Fin. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 58,515, Investment Advisers Act Release 
No. 2775, at 3 (Sept. 11, 2008). 
 37. Id. at 4. 
 38. Id. 
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requirements by failing to take action when alerted to possible security 
issues.39 
The SEC’s second enforcement action was brought against 
Commonwealth Equity Services after intruders accessed its intranet and 
acquired a list of its customers’ accounts.40  The intruders subsequently used 
eight compromised customer accounts to place orders before the activity was 
detected.41  The SEC found Commonwealth’s security procedures 
inadequate, despite the company’s written policies that addressed 
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards.42  The SEC noted the 
failure to employ basic safeguards, such as installing antivirus software on 
all computers connected to the internet.43  The SEC also emphasized the 
failure to address, or have a procedure to handle, security issues that were 
discovered through either audits or reports to the IT help desk.44  These 
weaknesses demonstrated that the policy was not reasonably designed as 
required.45 
The third enforcement action was brought against GunnAllen Financial 
after three laptop computers and an employee’s computer credentials were 
stolen, which put customer information at risk.46  The SEC found that the 
company’s written policy was insufficient because it failed to define specific 
procedures and safeguards that would be implemented.47  The SEC also 
noted the absence of staff guidance explaining their role in protecting 
customer information and complying with the safeguards rule.48  Similar to 
the action against Commonwealth, the SEC noted the absence of procedures 
for rectifying potential security issues and for responding to a breach.49 
Despite a relatively slow start, “[r]ecent enforcement actions targeting 
violations of the safeguards rule show that the SEC is serious about 
cybersecurity compliance.”50  Since 2015, the SEC has settled enforcement 
actions against three entities for failing to comply with the safeguards rule 
 
 39. Id. at 5. 
 40. Commonwealth Equity Servs., LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 60,733, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 2929, at 3 (Sept. 29, 2009). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 4. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 4–5. 
 45. Id. at 5. 
 46. Marc A. Ellis, Exchange Act Release No. 64,220, at 2 (Apr. 7, 2011). 
 47. Id. at 3. 
 48. Id. at 5. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Rajesh De et al., New Heads of Enforcement at the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission Continue Agency’s Focus on Cybersecurity, MAYER BROWN (July 12, 2017), 
https://www.mayerbrown.com/New-Heads-of-Enforcement-at-the-US-Securities-and-
Exchange-Commission-Continue-Agencys-Focus-on-Cybersecurity-07-12-2017/ 
[http://perma.cc/B6F8-6PQ4] (“The new enforcement co-directors’ very clear initial 
statements on cybersecurity mean that firms should expect cybersecurity enforcement and 
examination activity to continue under the new administration.”). 
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requirements.51  Through these actions, a clearer picture of what the SEC 
safeguards rule requires is emerging.52 
On September 22, 2015, the SEC brought and settled an action against R.T. 
Jones Capital Equities Management, Inc. after its web server was 
compromised, resulting in unauthorized access to the data therein.53  The 
SEC asserted that R.T. Jones failed to comply with the written policy 
requirement because it did not address the security and confidentiality of its 
clients’ personally identifiable information (PII) on the server or adequately 
address the protection of PII from “anticipated threats or unauthorized 
access.”54  The SEC noted that R.T. Jones did not schedule or conduct risk 
assessments regularly, or have a plan in place to respond to cybersecurity 
incidents.55  The SEC also noted the absence of technical safeguards, such as 
a firewall or the use of encryption on the server containing PII.56  This action 
marked a change from previous enforcement actions, as it “underscore[d] 
that investment advisers and broker-dealers may face regulatory scrutiny and 
enforcement actions even without a concrete, identifiable financial impact to 
clients.”57 
The SEC found it significant that R.T. Jones promptly undertook remedial 
efforts and cited those efforts in its decision.58  The first set of remedial 
measures included oversight changes, such as drafting and implementing an 
information-security policy.59  The second set involved technical changes, 
including ceasing to store PII on its webservers, encrypting PII stored on its 
 
 51. See generally Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78,021, 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4415 (June 8, 2016); Craig Scott Capital, LLC, 
Exchange Act Release No. 77,595 (Apr. 12, 2016); R.T. Jones Capital Equities Mgmt., Inc., 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4204 (Sept. 22, 2015). 
 52. Carmen Germaine, SEC Poised to Turn Cybersecurity Focus into Enforcement, 
LAW360 (July 7, 2017, 12:09 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/937197/sec-poised-to-
turn-cybersecurity-focus-into-enforcement [https://perma.cc/TE7E-MMUG].  See generally 
Julie Kadish, SEC’s Focus on Enforcing Data Security Safeguards Continues:  Lessons 
Learned from Its $1M Fine of Morgan Stanley, DYKEMA (June 15, 2016), 
https://www.dykema.com/resources-alerts-sec-focus-on-enforcing-data-security-safeguards-
continues-lessons-learned-from-its-1m-fine-of-morgan-stanley_06-15-2016.html 
[https://perma.cc/6ARA-8LBA]. 
 53. R.T. Jones Capital Equities Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4204, 
at 2–3 (Sept. 22, 2015). 
 54. Id. at 2. 
 55. Id. at 3. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Timothy C. Blank et al., SEC Cybersecurity Examinations and Enforcement:  What 
Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers Need to Know, DECHERT LLP (Sept. 29, 2015), 
https://s3.amazonaws.com/documents.lexology.com/729014f4-bfef-4c3c-96a5-
4e4d64c01f22.pdf [https://perma.cc/FF5X-YN54]; see also Jenna N. Felz, Data Security in 
the Financial Industry:  Five Key Developments to Keep an Eye on in 2016, DATA PRIVACY 
MONITOR (Jan. 27, 2016), https://www.dataprivacymonitor.com/financial-privacy/data-
security-in-the-financial-industry-five-key-developments-to-keep-an-eye-on-in-2016/ 
[https://perma.cc/34JZ-429Y] (“Notably, there was no evidence of any harm to clients as a 
result of the hack.”). 
 58. R.T. Jones Capital Equities Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4204, 
at 4 (Sept. 22, 2015). 
 59. Id. 
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internal networks, and installing tools to detect and respond to malicious 
activity.60  The final change was the retention of a cybersecurity firm to 
provide reports and advice regarding the firm’s security posture.61 
The SEC elaborated on its requirements for an adequate safeguard policy 
in its action against Craig Scott Capital (CSC).62  The action was not related 
to a breach but arose purely because CSC did not abide by the safeguards 
rule.63  In this action, the SEC found CSC’s written policy inadequate 
because it did not address how customer information would be handled 
internally.64  The policy was also found inadequate because it was incomplete 
and insufficiently “tailored to the actual practices at CSC.”65 
In addition to the inadequacy of the written policies and procedures, the 
SEC noted that CSC did not even follow the written policy.  The SEC also 
observed that CSC failed to encrypt customer information that was 
transmitted remotely despite including these measures in their written 
policy.66 
In a subsequent action, the SEC addressed internal safeguards focused on 
employee access to confidential information.  This action arose after a 
Morgan Stanley employee misappropriated customer data from 
approximately 730,000 accounts.67  The confidential data was stored on the 
employee’s personal server, which was likely hacked by a third party.68  
Some of the stolen data was then posted on a number of internet sites, with 
an offer of more stolen data for interested purchasers.69 
The SEC stated that, despite having written policies and procedures, 
Morgan Stanley had breached the safeguards rule.70  The safeguards were 
not reasonably designed to protect customers’ PII because they did not 
“adequately address certain key administrative, technical and physical 
safeguards.”71  It found that Morgan Stanley failed to adequately restrict 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 3–4. 
 62. Craig Scott Capital, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 77,595, at 5 (Apr. 12, 2016). 
 63. Id.; Kadish, supra note 52 (“This settlement serves as a reminder that both firms and 
individuals can be fined and held accountable even if no customer is financially harmed.”). 
 64. Craig Scott Capital, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 77,595, at 5 (Apr. 12, 2016). 
 65. Id. at 2. 
 66. Id. at 6. 
 67. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78,021, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 4415, at 2 (June 8, 2016); Press Release No. 15-334, U.S. Attorney’s 
Office, S.D.N.Y., Former Morgan Stanley Financial Adviser Sentenced in Manhattan Federal 
Court for Illegally Accessing Confidential Client Information (Dec. 22, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/former-morgan-stanley-financial-adviser-sentenced-
manhattan-federal-court-illegally-0 [https://perma.cc/LA3X-7RMR] (“MARSH illegally 
accessed the Bank’s confidential client information in order to use it for his personal advantage 
as a private wealth management adviser at the Bank.  From October 2013 through December 
2014, MARSH was engaged in discussions regarding potential employment with two other 
financial institutions that are competitors of the Bank.”). 
 68. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78,021, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 4415, at 2 (June 8, 2016). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 5–6. 
 71. Id. at 6. 
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employee access to the data necessary to accomplish a legitimate business 
need.72  Further, the SEC noted that Morgan Stanley did not monitor or 
analyze how employees were accessing data or using their system accesses.73  
For these reasons, the SEC found Morgan Stanley’s policies to be 
inadequate.74 
In addition to enforcement actions, the SEC releases guidance containing 
assessments and advice regarding cybersecurity that may indicate its 
expectations.75  In preparing these assessments, the SEC performs 
examinations of covered entities and evaluates their policies, including 
assessing whether the policies were actually implemented.76  They also 
evaluate how covered entities address areas including:  “(1) governance and 
risk assessment; (2) access rights and controls; (3) data loss prevention; 
(4) vendor management; (5) training; and (6) incident response.”77  In 
performing the most recent assessment, the SEC found that while there were 
improvements in cybersecurity and safeguards from previous evaluations, 
the majority of policies and procedures still suffered from deficiencies.78 
One issue that the SEC highlighted was the failure to reasonably tailor 
policies, such as through a lack of specificity.79  The SEC also noted that 
some firms did not enforce their policies or had written policies that did not 
accurately reflect the actual practices that were employed.80  The SEC went 
on to express concern that entities failed to perform ongoing system 
maintenance and omitted simple practices such as installing software patches 
addressing known vulnerabilities.81  These concerns reflect several elements 
discussed above in the enforcement actions, including the failure to create a 
detailed, tailored plan and to implement technical operational safeguards. 
The examples of robust security practices may constitute the most 
significant guidance.  One recommendation was to perform “a complete 
inventory of data and information, along with classifications of the risks, 
vulnerabilities, data, [and] business consequences.”82  Complementing this 
recommendation, the SEC suggested that requests for access to data by 
employees should be tracked and that policies and procedures should address 
the modification of employee access rights when their need to access data 
changed.83 
 
 72. Id. at 2. 
 73. Id. at 4. 
 74. Id. at 6. 
 75. See generally Observations from Cybersecurity Examinations, RISK ALERT (U.S. Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n, Aug. 7, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/files/observations-from-cybersecurity-
examinations.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7LG-6VRK]. 
 76. Id. at 1. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 3. 
 80. Id. at 4. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 4–5. 
 83. Id. at 5. 
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Another significant recommendation was to establish a plan of action that 
outlined what to do and who to contact in the event of a breach.84  Beyond 
this, the SEC recommended that senior management be involved in vetting 
and approving the policies and procedures.85 
The SEC also recommended utilizing vulnerability scans to identify 
weaknesses and adequately remediating any identified issues.86  This 
recommendation reflects some of the enforcement actions the SEC took with 
regard to known issues that the covered entities failed to address.  The SEC 
found it problematic that high-risk vulnerabilities discovered during such 
testing were not properly addressed.87 
The SEC recommended that covered entities provide guidance to 
employees explaining how the networks and equipment should be 
appropriately accessed and used.88  It suggested that entities consider 
including mandatory information-security training in their policy, as well as 
implementing procedures to ensure that such training was completed.89  The 
SEC also expressed concern that some entities did not enforce mandatory 
training despite including it in their policies.90 
2.  They Want to Be a Part of It:  New York, New York 
Department of Financial Services 
In 2017, the NYDFS promulgated regulations regarding cybersecurity at 
financial services companies.91  These regulations apply to entities that 
operate under a “certificate, permit, accreditation or similar authorization 
under the Banking Law, the Insurance Law or the Financial Services Law.”92  
This has the potential to “encompass an extremely broad range of businesses 
given the vast scope of New York banking, insurance, and financial services 
laws.”93  Entities that are likely to be covered include, “commercial banks, 
foreign banks with New York State-licensed offices, mortgage brokers and 
servicers, small-loan lenders and money transmitters doing business in New 
York.”94  In addition, these entities are responsible for the actions of third 
parties they share data with.95 
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 4. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 5. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 4. 
 91. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500 (2017). 
 92. Id. § 500.01. 
 93. Krimminger et al., supra note 18, at 2. 
 94. Adam J. Fleisher & Nathan D. Taylor, New York Cybersecurity Regulations:  What 
Do They Mean and When Do They Mean It By?, MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, at 1–2 (Mar. 
23, 2017), https://media2.mofo.com/documents/170323-ny-cybersecurity-regulations.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/7LHA-MFL6]. 
 95. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500. 
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In contrast to the jurisdiction of the SEC, the NYDFS does not directly 
license or regulate investment advisors, brokers, or dealers in New York.96  
However, the entities that are regulated by the NYDFS are often affiliated 
with investment advisers, brokers, and dealers.  Because of this, they usually 
share computer and communications infrastructure with entities regulated by 
the SEC, meaning that these entities are often subject to both regulations.97  
This is because it would be inefficient for many of those entities to deploy 
separate networks for different branches of business.98  These factors are 
significant in evaluating the NYDFS regulations since they possibly reach 
beyond the entities they directly address.99  For the purposes of this Note, it 
is enough to recognize that the NYDFS regulations will likely apply to some 
entities covered by the SEC regulations. 
The NYDFS promulgated these regulations because they believed there 
was a need for minimum standards due to the serious nature of the risk.100  
The regulations require covered entities to assess the specific risks they face 
and adopt a program designed to protect themselves and their customers.101 
The NYDFS requires that entities “implement and maintain a written 
policy or policies . . . setting forth [their] policies and procedures” to protect 
their information systems.102  These policies must address concerns such as 
customer data privacy, incident response, and systems and network 
security.103  The NYDFS regulations define functions that should be 
addressed, such as detecting cybersecurity events, responding to and 
mitigating events that occur, recovering from the event and restoring normal 
operations and services, and fulfilling reporting requirements.104  The 
NYDFS regulations identify fourteen specific areas that should be addressed 
when applicable, including data governance and classification, asset 
 
 96. Marcus A. Asner et al., New York Department of Financial Services Issues Final 
Cybersecurity Regulations, ARNOLD & PORTER KAYE SCHOLER (Feb. 22, 2017), 
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2017/02/new-york-department-
of-financial-services [https://perma.cc/KRT8-Q242]. 
 97. Id. (“[T]he use of common computer and communications platforms among affiliated 
financial services firms may as a practical matter regulate the operations of broker-dealer and 
investment adviser firms that are affiliated with Covered Entities.”). 
 98. Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, Cyber Winter Is Here, and Coming to 
Regulation:  New York Cybersecurity Rule Ice Dragon Heading for the Wall, JD SUPRA (Oct. 
4, 2017), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/new-york-cybersecurity-rule-ice-dragon-
40435/ [https://perma.cc/LY8V-E4UY] (“Many large institutions gain efficiencies by 
deploying centrally managed information technology platforms and cybersecurity programs 
and tools.  Thus, if only a part of an organization falls under the Cybersecurity Rules, it would 
be impractical for the larger enterprise not to adhere to the Cybersecurity Rules.”). 
 99. Steven R. Chabinsky et al., Cybersecurity:  Regulators Show Their Teeth, WHITE & 
CASE LLP (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.whitecase.com/sites/whitecase/files/files/download/ 
publications/cybersecurity-regulators-show-teeth-2.pdf [http://perma.cc/35N2-W5NC]. 
 100. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. § 500.03. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. § 500.02. 
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inventory, access controls, and systems and network security and 
monitoring.105 
Covered entities also must have incident response plans that address 
internal processes; goals; clearly defined “roles, responsibilities and levels of 
decision-making authority”; information sharing; methods of vulnerability 
identification and remediation; methods of documentation and reporting; and 
the evaluation and revision of such plans following a cybersecurity event.106 
The NYDFS regulations also require that the compliance plan implement 
methods of testing and monitoring, which permits entities to choose between 
continuous monitoring or periodic penetration testing and vulnerability 
assessments.107  The NYDFS does not mandate any specific method for 
continuous monitoring.108  However, the monitoring should be designed to 
identify changes that potentially create vulnerabilities and activities that may 
be malicious.109  The NYDFS explicitly provides that “periodic manual 
review of logs and firewall configurations” are not sufficient steps to satisfy 
the continuous monitoring obligation.110 
With regard to personnel with access to systems, the NYDFS requires that 
covered entities implement access controls and periodically review what 
privileges employees require.111  Entities must also implement systems to 
monitor user activity and detect unauthorized activity by those users.112  
They also require the entity to regularly provide current cybersecurity 
training.113 
The NYDFS regulations require some specific measures that act as 
effective controls on data flows, such as multifactor authentication when the 
entity allows the internal network to be accessed externally through remote 
access or other means.114  A second specified measure is implementing 
encryption to protect customer data both while traversing external networks 
and while at rest internally.115 
 
 105. Id. § 500.03 (listing “(a) information security; (b) data governance and classification; 
(c) asset inventory and device management; (d) access controls and identity management; 
(e) business continuity and disaster recovery planning and resources; (f) systems operations 
and availability concerns; (g) systems and network security; (h) systems and network 
monitoring; (i) systems and application development and quality assurance; (j) physical 
security and environmental controls; (k) customer data privacy; (l) vendor and Third Party 
Service Provider management; (m) risk assessment; and (n) incident response”). 
 106. Id. § 500.16. 
 107. Id. § 500.05. 
 108. Frequently Asked Questions Regarding 23 NYCRR Part 500, N.Y. DEP’T FIN. 
SERVICES, http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/cybersecurity_faqs.htm [https://perma.cc/48YP-
A7H2] (last updated Aug. 9, 2018). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500.07. 
 112. Id. § 500.14. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. § 500.12. 
 115. Id. § 500.15(a). 
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3.  The Final Countdown to the GDPR 
On April 27, 2016, the EU adopted the GDPR.116  The Regulation became 
effective on May 25, 2018.117  The jurisdiction provided under the GDPR 
reaches further than either the SEC or NYDFS regulations.  The GDPR 
applies 
to the processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by 
a controller or processor not established in the Union, where the processing 
activities are related to . . . the offering of goods or services, irrespective of 
whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in 
the Union; or . . . the monitoring of their [behavior] as far as their 
[behavior] takes place within the Union.118 
This broad territorial scope means that the physical location of the entity will 
be less significant, with the focus instead being on where the data came 
from.119  Practically, this may mean that companies marketing goods or 
services in the EU will be subject to the GDPR.120  This would include any 
financial institution marketing services to EU clients. 
The Regulation states that to protect customer data, “measures should 
ensure an appropriate level of security, including confidentiality, taking into 
account the state of the art and the costs of implementation in relation to the 
risks and the nature of the personal data to be protected.”121  The GDPR also 
requires a written policy or procedure in the form of a data protection impact 
assessment (DPIA) whenever activities involve a high risk to the rights and 
freedoms of EU persons.122  While the analysis necessary to evaluate high 
risk is not wholly settled, the EU Working Party 29 (WP29)123 suggests a list 
of ten factors and recommends that if two are met a DPIA should be 
 
 116. Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 88 (EU). 
 117. Id. art. 99. 
 118. Id. art. 3. 
 119. Jonathan Millard & Tyler Newby, EU’s General Data Protection Regulation:  
Sweeping Changes Coming to European and U.S. Companies, A.B.A. (May 23, 2016), 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/technology/articles/spring2016-0516-eu-
general-data-protection-regulation.html [https://perma.cc/K3UH-8Y78] (“Jurisdiction 
will . . . be measured digitally rather than physically, paying less attention to the physical 
location of the entity undertaking the processing.”). 
 120. Courtney M. Bowman, A Primer on the GDPR:  What You Need to Know, PROSKAUER 
(Dec. 23, 2015), http://privacylaw.proskauer.com/2015/12/articles/european-union/a-primer-
on-the-gdpr-what-you-need-to-know/ [https://perma.cc/7JMX-W2RP]. 
 121. Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 116, recital 83. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Privacy & Cybersecurity Update—
October 2017, JD SUPRA (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/privacy-
cybersecurity-update-october-54232/ [https://perma.cc/P7SR-AY7K] (“WP29 is an EU 
advisory body made up of representatives from the data protection authorities of EU members.  
It is charged with providing expert guidance on data protection issues and promoting uniform 
application of data protection laws across the EU.  Though not technically binding on EU 
member states’ individual data protection commissioners, WP29’s guidance carries a good 
deal of weight when the individual commissioners evaluate data privacy issues.”). 
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performed.124  Two factors the WP29 identifies that almost certainly apply 
to U.S. financial institutions are sensitive data, such as financial data, and 
data that will be transferred outside of the EU.125  Of the remaining factors, 
several seem likely to apply to financial institutions as well.126  While 
financial institutions will always need to perform a fact-specific analysis to 
evaluate whether a DPIA is necessary, the WP29 guidance suggests that it 
will nearly always be necessary in this context.127 
While a DPIA evaluates more than security, one of only four requirements 
of such an assessment is to identify the measures an entity intends to take to 
mitigate the risks to personal data,128 which indicates the significance of this 
element.129  The measures adopted should be based on factors such as costs, 
state of the art, risk, and severity of the rights at issue, and they also must 
address issues such as data flow, unauthorized access, and destruction or 
degradation of data, among a number of other concerns.130 
The GDPR also suggests the use of some specific measures such as 
encryption, de-identification, security-measure testing, and the remediation 
of any vulnerabilities uncovered as a result of such testing.131  It specifically 
suggests that pseudonymization and encryption might be appropriate 
measures to adopt.132  The GDPR also recommends establishing means to 
regularly test and evaluate the effectiveness of the adopted measures.133 
A covered entity may be able to avoid the notification requirements in the 
GDPR if the breach “is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms 
of natural persons.”134  For example, if a covered entity utilizes encryption 
to make the information unintelligible, they may not have to report the 
breach.135  It is important to recognize that this requires reevaluations and 
can change with time, as vulnerabilities can be discovered and encryption 
 
 124. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on Data Protection Impact 
Assessment (DPIA) and Determining Whether Processing Is “Likely to Result in a High Risk” 
for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679, at 7–9, WP 248 (Apr. 4, 2017). 
 125. Id. at 8–9. 
 126. See id. at 7–10. 
 127. See id. at 9–10. 
 128. Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 116, art. 35. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. art. 32. 
 131. Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks, Two-Way Street:  U.S.-EU 
Parallels Under the General Data Protection Regulation Ghostery/Hogan Lovells Data Privacy 
Day (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/910663/ 
160121hoganghostery_dpd.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GAS-2PEU]. 
 132. Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 116, art. 32. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. art. 33. 
 135. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on Personal Data Breach 
Notification Under Regulation 2016/679, at 9, WP 250 (Oct. 3, 2017). 
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keys can be compromised.136  In evaluating that risk, the covered entity 
should objectively consider “both the likelihood and severity of the risk.”137 
The WP29 interprets elements of the GDPR to create an obligation to 
“have internal processes in place to be able to detect and address a breach.”138  
This could include technical measures that allow the entity “to define events 
and alerts.”139  The WP29 recommends that the measures adopted be 
included in the entities’ incident response plan.140 
B.  The Costs of Regulation 
Regulations inevitably create costs, which have real effects on economies, 
consumers, and institutions.141  The total estimated cost of regulatory 
compliance in the United States in 2008 was $1.75 trillion.142  There are 
substantial benefits to regulation that can offset these costs, and regulation is 
a necessary element in a functioning country and society.143  However, 
regulation clearly creates substantial burdens as well.144  These burdens are 
shared between public and private institutions, and between businesses and 
their customers.145  When compliance costs go up, some portion is pushed 
onto consumers or employees.146 
 
 136. Id. at 16 (“A breach that would not require notification to the supervisory authority 
would be the loss of a securely encrypted mobile device, utilised by the [covered entity] and 
its staff.  Provided the encryption key remains within the secure possession of the [covered 
entity] and this is not the sole copy of the personal data then the personal data would be 
inaccessible to an attacker.  This means the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights 
and freedoms of the data subjects in question.  If it later becomes evident that the encryption 
key was compromised or that the encryption software or algorithm is vulnerable, then the risk 
to the rights and freedoms of natural persons will change and thus notification may now be 
required.”). 
 137. Id. at 20.  Factors to consider include:  (1) “the type of breach”; (2) “the nature, 
sensitivity, and volume of personal data”; (3) “ease of identification of individuals”; 
(4) “severity of consequences for individuals”; (5) “special characteristics of the individual”; 
(6) “the number of affected individuals”; and (7) “special characteristics of the data 
controller.” Id. at 20–22. 
 138. Id. at 10. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. See JOHN BACE ET AL., UNDERSTANDING THE COSTS OF COMPLIANCE 4–5 (2006), 
http://logic.stanford.edu/POEM/externalpapers/understanding_the_costs_of_c_138098.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/47UX-QRCH]; Kevin Dobbs, Since Dodd-Frank, Compliance Costs Up at 
Least 20% for Many U.S. Banks, S&P GLOBAL MKT. INTELLIGENCE (Oct. 19, 2017, 9:53 AM), 
https://marketintelligence.spglobal.com/our-thinking/ideas/since-dodd-frank-compliance-
costs-up-at-least-20-for-many-u-s-banks; William Dunkelberg, The Insidious Cost of 
Regulation, FORBES (Apr. 4, 2017, 10:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
williamdunkelberg/2017/04/04/the-insidious-cost-of-regulation/#68798dc35c7b 
[https://perma.cc/WC2K-Z87T]. 
 142. NICOLE V. CRAIN & W. MARK CRAIN, THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY COSTS ON SMALL 
FIRMS 6 (2010), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/The%20Impact%20of%20Regulatory 
%20Costs%20on%20Small%20Firms%20(Full)_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/654C-39T3]. 
 143. Id. at 10–11. 
 144. Id. at 6. 
 145. Id. 
 146. See Dobbs, supra note 141.  See generally CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 142. 
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Another result of rising compliance costs is consolidation.  Some predict 
that compliance will drive small institutions out of the marketplace.147  
Compliance costs more for smaller businesses than it does for larger ones, 
with the costs of compliance estimated at $10,585 per employee at a firm 
with fewer than twenty employees, compared to $7755 per employee at a 
firm with 500 employees or more.148  This means that smaller firms pay 
around 36 percent more per employee than larger firms do, largely because 
many compliance regimes have fixed costs that are diluted with scale.149 
As profit margins decline and compliance costs increase, the number of 
small financial institutions has dwindled.150  This could result in less 
competition and decreased consumer choice, barriers to new entrants who 
could offer improved services, and fewer institutions willing to underwrite 
smaller businesses.151 
While cybersecurity regulations are necessary, unnecessary costs should 
be mitigated.  This Note recommends that regulators identify the areas where 
a single process or action could satisfy the different regulatory regimes and 
provide collaborative guidance in those areas.  Part II explores some of these 
areas of overlap. 
II.  IDENTIFYING AREAS OF OPPORTUNITY FOR COORDINATION 
These regulations, where they address cybersecurity posture and plans, all 
attempt to accommodate changing cybersecurity needs.  The three regulatory 
schemes presented above are representative of cybersecurity regulations 
governing financial institutions but are not exhaustive.  Since financial 
 
 147. Dobbs, supra note 141 (“[S]ome in the industry expect M&A to continue for years 
and eventually result in a banking landscape all but devoid of small institutions.”). 
 148. CRAIN & CRAIN, supra note 142, at 8. 
 149. Id.; Hester Peirce, Dwindling Numbers in the Financial Industry, BROOKINGS (May 
15, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/dwindling-numbers-in-the-financial-industry/ 
[https://perma.cc/7YQ3-5EMP] (“Many regulations disproportionately burden small 
[financial institutions] that are not subsidiaries of a larger firm with extensive compliance 
resources.”). 
 150. Peirce, supra note 149 (“The number of [broker-dealers] has declined fairly 
consistently over the last decade.  In March 2017, there were 3,989 [broker-dealers] registered 
with the SEC compared to 5,892 in March 2007, a more than thirty percent drop.”); see also 
Nick Fera, How Small Broker-Dealers Can Survive in Today’s Shifting Trading Landscape, 
THESTREET (Sept. 10, 2015, 10:25 AM), https://www.thestreet.com/story/13267934/1/are-
you-a-small-broker-dealer-here-s-how-you-can-survive.html [http://perma.cc/E7BZ-D68A] 
(“The number of broker-dealer firms registered with the Financial Industry Regulatory 
Authority dropped to 4,040 by April 2015 from 4,578 in 2010, a nearly 12% decrease . . . .  
Most analysts and industry experts agree that there are two primary factors fueling this trend:  
shrinking margins and swelling compliance costs.”); Bruce Kelly, With Margins Crashing, 
Broker-Dealers Look to Merge:  Report, INVESTMENTNEWS (Sept. 21, 2017, 2:15 PM), 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20170921/FREE/170929982/with-margins-
crashing-broker-dealers-look-to-merge-report [https://perma.cc/34KR-ZTDT] (“The number 
of [Independent Broker-Dealers] has declined 28%, with 904 open for business in 2015, 
compared to 1,255 such firms that were up and running in 2005.  And with increased regulation 
pressuring profits, broker-dealer operating margins dropped from 12% in 2006 to just 3% in 
2016.”). 
 151. Peirce, supra note 149. 
422 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87 
institutions fall under the jurisdiction of each of these bodies, as well as 
others, it would be valuable to ascertain where requirements are common and 
can be adopted as part of a single compliance plan. 
Part II focuses on identifying elements common to all three regulatory 
regimes.  The purpose is to recognize the areas where the regulatory bodies 
are operating in the same or similar spaces.  Part II is not intended to be a 
comprehensive analysis of every area where harmonization could occur.  
Rather, it identifies a few requirements that are costly to implement and 
significant within the regulatory regimes to serve as examples.  Part II.A 
addresses data classification, II.B the formulation of written policies, and II.C 
the implementation of encryption. 
A.  Classing Up the Joint:  Data Classification 
Data classification “is the process of identifying, understanding and 
mapping out the data flows of an organisation.”152  This requires an 
exhaustive cataloging of the information held by the entity, with the end 
product being a visual representation of data assets and flows.153  This 
visualization illustrates the different types of data held by the organization 
and the way that data is transferred and disclosed both within the organization 
and to third parties.154  Engaging in such a process can provide an entity with 
a comprehensive understanding of how their data travels both inside and 
outside of their networks.155  Although this area is discussed the most 
obliquely by all three regulatory regimes, it is fundamental to a discussion of 
compliance under any of them.156  As a practical matter, data classification 
is necessary to comply with all three regulatory regimes.157 
In its action against Morgan Stanley, the SEC suggests an obligation to 
limit employee access based on need.158  This indicates an expectation that 
covered entities evaluate employee needs for data and provide the lowest 
level of access privilege necessary to satisfy those needs.  This is significant 
because it requires that an entity classify the data it holds and contemplate 
what controls it should exercise over the movement of that data. 
The SEC also indicated the necessity of data classification through 
guidance and suggested that entities have “a complete inventory of data and 
information, along with classifications of the risks, vulnerabilities, data, 
[and] business consequences.”159  The SEC also recommends tracking 
 
 152. BAKER & MCKENZIE LLP, EU GENERAL DATA PROTECTION REGULATION IN 13 GAME 
CHANGERS 33 (2018), https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/-/media/files/insight/publications/ 
2018/05/bk_uk_eugeneraldataprotection_mar2018.pdf. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
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 156. Id. at 34 (“Understanding one’s . . . data flows . . . is an essential prerequisite for any 
privacy compliance strategy.”). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78,021, Investment 
Advisers Act Release No. 4415, at 2 (June 8, 2016). 
 159. Observations from Cybersecurity Examinations, supra note 75, at 4–5. 
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employee access requests and creating policies and procedures governing the 
modification of access rights.160  These recommendations indicate that 
entities should catalog the data they hold, consider the categories of data in 
terms of risk, implement safeguards based on those considerations, and limit 
and monitor access to the data. 
Finally, it is significant to note that the SEC requires a written policy that 
is reasonably tailored.  This requires “more than a generic, cookie-cutter 
cybersecurity policy.”161  To formulate such a policy, covered entities must 
meaningfully analyze the specific risks they face.162  The SEC guidance 
notes that narrowly scoped and vague policies do not satisfy the reasonably 
tailored requirement, nor do policies that only offer general guidance or 
limited examples of safeguards.163  For a policy to be reasonably tailored, it 
is crucial to identify how data and communications travel within the 
organization and to prioritize data resources “based on their classification, 
criticality, and business value.”164  By approaching the process in this way, 
entities will be able to identify what requires protection and the appropriate 
level of protection, which will lead to a reasonably tailored policy.165 
The NYDFS regulations require that a covered entity assess data 
governance and classification, asset inventory and device management, and 
access controls and identity management.166  Covered entities must identify 
what material nonpublic information they hold and where they are holding 
that information, as such cataloging “is foundational for compliance with the 
Cybersecurity Rules.”167 
Many of the requirements under the NYDFS regulations can only be 
achieved after the data the covered entity holds has been classified.  For 
example, covered entities must implement user access controls that limit 
personnel access to personal information.168  This requires covered entities 
to identify the information and systems that individual employees need 
access to and to only permit the level of access that is required.169  A covered 
entity will need to identify all the relevant data in order to satisfy this 
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 168. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500.07. 
 169. Joseph Vitale et al., NYDFS Proposed Cybersecurity Regulation for Financial 
Services Companies, SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL LLP, at 4 (Sept. 15, 2016), 
https://www.srz.com/images/content/1/4/v2/145023/091516-NYDFS-Proposes-Detailed-
and-Sweeping-Cybersecurity-Regula.pdf [http://perma.cc/8UQG-Q3X5]. 
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requirement.170  Similarly, the covered entities must assess all data and 
systems in order to identify which will be governed by the specified measures 
discussed above, such as multifactor authentication and encryption 
requirements, and take steps to satisfy the requirements.171 
The GDPR includes an accountability principle, which obligates covered 
entities to maintain records that demonstrate their compliance with the 
GDPR.172  This includes recording the purpose for which they hold data as 
well as the ways they are processing it.173  The covered entity must also track 
where the data is transferred, including locations outside the EU, and how 
that data is handled, including how long it is retained.174  Finally, it must 
document the technical and organizational measures taken to demonstrate 
compliance with the requirements.175  To satisfy this obligation, the United 
Kingdom Information Commissioner’s Office recommends that covered 
entities “document what personal data [they] hold, where it came from and 
who [they] share it with” and adds that it may be necessary “to [organize] an 
information audit.”176 
In addition to facilitating compliance with the accountability requirements, 
data classification would permit timely compliance with other obligations, 
such as providing requested data to supervisory authorities.177  It would also 
allow covered entities to demonstrate that their plans protect data by design 
and by default, as required.178  A final benefit would be an enhanced ability 
to assess the risks to the rights and freedoms of EU citizens.  Since the GDPR 
advocates such a risk-based approach, data classification will help an entity 
determine the extent of their GDPR obligations.179 
 
 170. PWC Fin. Crimes Unit, Cyber:  New York Regulator Moves the Goalposts, FIN. 
CRIMES OBSERVER (Sept. 2016), https://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-services/financial-
crimes/publications/assets/NY-DFS-proposes-cybersecurity-regulations.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8KS3-SBQV]. 
 171. Asner et al., supra note 96. 
 172. Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 116, art. 30; Preparing for the General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR):  12 Steps to Take Now, INFO. COMMISSIONER’S OFF. 3 
(2018) [hereinafter Preparing for the GDPR], https://web.archive.org/web/20180706184647/ 
https://ico.org.uk/media/1624219/preparing-for-the-gdpr-12-steps.pdf. 
 173. Hanno Timner & Alex van der Wolk, M&A and the New European Data Protection 
Rules:  Additional Risks for Transactions and How to Avoid Them, 20 WALL STREET LAW., 
July 2016, at 6. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Preparing for the GDPR, supra note 172, at 3. 
 177. BAKER & MCKENZIE LLP, supra note 152, at 35. 
 178. Id.; Teresa Troester-Falk & Paul Breitbarth, Does GDPR Article 30 Require a Data 
Inventory?, NYMITY (July 2017), https://www.nymity.com/~/media/NymityAura/Resources/ 
Nymity%20Insights/Nymity_Insights-GDPR_Article_30_Data_Inventory.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8WSP-SW27] (“Logically, until an organisation truly understands what 
personal data they have, where it is located, and how it moves through and out of the 
organisation, it is not possible to protect it nor is it possible to fully comply with the GDPR 
(at least in spirit).”). 
 179. BAKER & MCKENZIE LLP, supra note 152, at 34. 
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B.  Words Are Easy, Like the Wind; but Writing Is Hard 
All three regulatory regimes require a documented policy, with some 
differences in explicitness and the factors that must be considered.  In 
cybersecurity examinations, the SEC focused on “(1) governance and risk 
assessment; (2) access rights and controls; (3) data loss prevention; 
(4) vendor management; (5) training; and (6) incident response.”180  The 
SEC’s focus on these six factors indicates that these factors influence whether 
the policy is reasonably designed to protect consumer information and is 
tailored to the entity’s needs.  A covered entity should closely consider these 
factors in formulating its written policy. 
Early SEC enforcement actions provide insight into what it expects the 
written policy to contain, such as technical security measures and 
administrative procedures for addressing security issues.181  The SEC actions 
indicate that the policies must be tailored and, therefore, specific.182  The 
SEC also found a written policy insufficient because it failed to provide 
guidance and training regarding data protection to personnel.183 
Subsequent enforcement actions indicate more specific requirements and 
note their subjects’ failure to address elements such as periodic risk 
assessments, firewall use, a response plan in the event of a breach, or 
measures for handling data.184  This marks a change from the early 
enforcement actions, as the SEC looks beyond a failure to address known 
issues or implement the most basic of security measures.  These actions 
suggest that the SEC will take a closer look at the policies and evaluate the 
measures taken on a more technical level moving forward.  A part of this 
more technical analysis seems to include assessing whether the policy 
reflects a real consideration of the unique infrastructure utilized by a covered 
entity in deciding whether it was appropriately tailored.185  A final 
development appears to be a requirement to include procedures to implement 
and monitor employee access controls.186 
The NYDFS regulations also require that the written policy address 
physical, administrative, and technical controls.187  The written policy must 
comprehensively outline all aspects of the entity’s cybersecurity program and 
identify how the entity complies with each element of the regulations.188  
Although more explicit and extensive than the requirements the SEC has 
articulated, the NYDFS regulations include many similar elements.  Specific 
 
 180. Observations from Cybersecurity Examinations, supra note 75. 
 181. See generally Marc A. Ellis, Exchange Act Release No. 64,220 (Apr. 7, 2011); 
Commonwealth Equity Servs., LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 60,733, Investment Advisers 
Act Release No. 2929 (Sept. 29, 2009). 
 182. See Marc A. Ellis, Exchange Act Release No. 64,220, at 3 (Apr. 7, 2011). 
 183. Id. 
 184. See R.T. Jones Capital Equities Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 
4204, at 3 (Sept. 22, 2015). 
 185. See Craig Scott Capital, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 77,595, at 2 (Apr. 12, 2016). 
 186. See Morgan Stanley Smith Barney LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 78,021, 
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4415, at 2–3 (June 8, 2016). 
 187. Chabinsky et al., supra note 99. 
 188. Vitale et al., supra note 169, at 3. 
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elements include measures addressing information security, data governance 
and classification, asset inventory and device management, access controls 
and identity management,189 systems and network security, systems and 
network monitoring, customer data privacy, and incident response.190  The 
plan must also address the cybersecurity training program.191 
It is also likely that financial institutions will be required to perform a 
DPIA under the GDPR.192  This assessment must include a list of the actions 
the entity will take and the tools they will employ to protect their data.193  
Even absent a DPIA, the GDPR requires a policy that includes “appropriate 
technical and organisational measures.”194  This means that the policies must 
address security risks as they affect the “confidentiality, integrity, availability 
and resilience” of systems, the entity’s ability to maintain “availability and 
access to personal data,” and the “testing, assessing and evaluating” of 
measures in place.195  These measures should be based on the available 
technology as well as context, costs, and risks.196 
The WP29 also indicates that measures should be in place to manage the 
network through traffic analysis.197  It identifies the development of 
capabilities aimed at preventing a breach when possible, and reacting in a 
timely manner when not, as key to a data security policy.198  Finally, it 
identifies the detection, remediation, and timely reporting of a breach as 
essential elements of a security policy.199 
C.  5 14 3 18 25 16 20 9 15 14 
Encryption is the “process of changing plaintext into ciphertext for the 
purpose of security or privacy.”200  Plaintext is what you are reading now, 
text that has not been coded or encrypted to make it unintelligible.201  
Somewhat circuitously, ciphertext is text that has been encrypted or rendered 
unintelligible through the use of a cipher.202  Plaintext is transformed into 
 
 189. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500.14 (2017) (including specific “policies, 
procedures and controls designed to monitor the activity of Authorized Users and detect 
unauthorized access or use of, or tampering with, Nonpublic Information by such Authorized 
Users”). 
 190. Id. § 500.03. 
 191. Id. § 500.14. 
 192. See supra Part I.A. 
 193. Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 116, art. 35. 
 194. Id. art. 32. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, supra note 135, at 10. 
 198. Id. at 6. 
 199. Id. at 11. 
 200. ELAINE BARKER, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 
800-175B, GUIDELINE FOR USING CRYPTOGRAPHIC STANDARDS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:  
CRYPTOGRAPHIC MECHANISMS 5 (2016), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/ 
NIST.SP.800-175B.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3WB-Q3L5]. 
 201. Id. at 7. 
 202. Id. at 4. 
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ciphertext through the use of cryptographic methods.203  These methods rely 
on the use of an algorithm204 and a key.205  These components are used in 
conjunction to encrypt and decrypt the data.206  Since the algorithm is usually 
publicly available, the secrecy of the key is what provides the security 
benefits derived from the use of cryptography.207  Two common types of 
cryptographic algorithms that permit relatively rapid data movement are 
cryptographic hash functions208 and symmetric-key algorithms.209 
Cryptographic algorithms have a finite lifetime, as they can be attacked 
and compromised over time, which prevents the algorithm from providing 
the desired level of protection.210  This lifetime is often linked to the 
algorithm strength, which is measured by the difficulty of breaking the 
algorithm.211  Algorithm strength can generally be increased by lengthening 
the key.212  It is also critically important to adopt adequate safeguards for 
selecting and handling the keys themselves.213 
The SEC has not created any rule-based requirement regarding the use of 
encryption.214  Rather, it has suggested the need for encryption through 
 
 203. Id. at 1 (“Cryptography is a branch of mathematics that is based on the transformation 
of data and can be used to provide several security services . . . .”). 
 204. Id. at 4 (defining cryptographic algorithm as “[a] well-defined computational 
procedure that takes variable inputs, including a cryptographic key (if applicable), and 
produces an output”). 
 205. Id. (defining cryptographic key as “[a] parameter used in conjunction with a 
cryptographic algorithm that determines its operation in such a way that an entity with 
knowledge of the key can reproduce or reverse the operation, while an entity without 
knowledge of the key cannot”). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. at 19 (“A hash function (also called a hash algorithm) is a cryptographic primitive 
algorithm that produces a condensed representation of its input (e.g., a message).  A hash 
function takes an input of arbitrary length and outputs a value with a predetermined length.”). 
 209. Id. at 20 (“Symmetric-key algorithms (sometimes called secret-key algorithms) use a 
single key to both apply cryptographic protection and to remove or check the protection.  For 
example, the key used to encrypt data (i.e., apply protection) is also used to decrypt the 
encrypted data (i.e., remove the protection) . . . .”). 
 210. Id. at 27 (“The attack could be on the algorithm itself, or could be on the algorithm 
with a specific key length.  In the latter case, the use of a longer key may prevent a successful 
attack, or at least delay it for a period of time.”). 
 211. Id. at 26 (“Breaking a cryptographic algorithm can be defined as defeating some aspect 
of the protection that the algorithm is intended to provide.  For example, a block cipher 
encryption algorithm that is used to protect the confidentiality of data is broken if, with an 
acceptable amount of work, it is possible to determine the value of its key or to recover the 
plaintext from the ciphertext without knowledge of the key.”). 
 212. Id. at 27 (“The approved security strengths for federal applications are 112, 128, 192 
and 256 bits.  Note that a security strength of 80 bits was previously approved as well.” 
(emphasis omitted)). 
 213. Id. at 37 (“[T]he security of information protected by cryptography directly depends 
on the strength of the keys, the effectiveness of mechanisms and protocols associated with 
keys, and the protection afforded to the keys themselves.”). 
 214. NEXT Fin. Grp., Inc., Initial Decision Release No. 349, at 40 (Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 
ALJ June 18, 2008) (“The SEC neither established minimum standards nor discussed 
encryption when it proposed and adopted Regulation S-P.”). 
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enforcement actions215 and guidance.216  The SEC noted in its action against 
R.T. Jones that a failure to encrypt client PII was problematic.217  While 
enumerating positive changes made by R.T. Jones, the SEC specifically 
mentioned that the company began encrypting client PII.218  In the CSC 
enforcement action, the SEC also discussed the failure to use encryption.219  
The attention to encryption in two of its most recent enforcement actions 
likely indicates that the SEC views encryption as an important measure to 
consider. 
The SEC guidance also focused on encryption and described it as a 
potential part of a robust security policy.220  The encryption recommendation 
is significant since it indicates that the SEC expects a network to be 
adequately designed to limit the damage caused by an intrusion.  The 
encryption recommendation indicates that the SEC recognizes this as a useful 
tool in mitigating damage and in rendering information on a network 
inaccessible in the event of a breach. 
The NYDFS regulations require that data both in transit and at rest be 
encrypted unless the entity’s chief information security officer finds that it is 
infeasible.221  While requiring that data “in transit over external networks and 
at rest” be encrypted, the NYDFS offers little guidance regarding how it 
should be implemented beyond that it must be based on a risk assessment.222  
Notably missing is guidance—like that issued by New York State to state 
agencies—regarding acceptable forms of encryption, including minimum bit 
strength and minimum key length.223 
The GDPR recommends encryption as a possible measure for entities to 
adopt.224  It also permits covered entities to avoid breach disclosure if the 
information breached is not intelligible due to appropriate technical 
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R.T. Jones Capital Equities Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4204, at 3 
(Sept. 22, 2015). 
 216. Observations from Cybersecurity Examinations, supra note 75, at 5. 
 217. R.T. Jones Capital Equities Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4204, 
at 3 (Sept. 22, 2015). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Craig Scott Capital, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 77,595, at 6 (Apr. 12, 2016). 
 220. Observations from Cybersecurity Examinations, supra note 75, at 5. 
 221. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 500.15 (2017). 
 222. Id. 
 223. NYS OFFICE OF INFO. TECH. SERVS., NO:  NYS-S14-007, IT STANDARD:  ENCRYPTION 
(July 11, 2017), https://its.ny.gov/sites/default/files/documents/nys-s14-007_encryption_ 
standard_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UPB-3CPL] (“Encryption products for confidentiality of 
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 224. GDPR Preparedness:  An Indicator of Cyber Risk Management, MARSH & 
MCLENNAN COMPANIES, at 6 (Oct. 2017), https://www.marsh.com/content/dam/marsh/ 
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computers—is explicitly encouraged by GDPR.”). 
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measures, including encryption.225  The WP29 endorses the use of a “state of 
the art algorithm.”226  It also states that the data should be properly 
encrypted.227  The WP29 suggests that determining the proper encryption 
method requires an in-depth analysis of the risks the entity faces and the 
quality of the encryption method, including the level of protection it provides 
and the steps necessary to properly implement it.228 
III.  THE BENEFITS OF COORDINATION AND ITS APPLICATION IN 
CYBERSECURITY REGULATION 
Part III proceeds in two parts.  Part III.A discusses why collaboration is 
generally desirable and presents a few examples of mechanisms that could 
be used to effectuate international and domestic regulatory compromise.  Part 
III.B explores how these mechanisms could be applied to further clarify the 
requirements for data classification, written policies, and encryption, and the 
specific benefits of such mechanisms. 
A.  The Why and How of Coordinating Cybersecurity Regulations 
Cooperation between the regulatory bodies “will inevitably yield better, 
and more consistent, policy formation and guidance on both sides of the 
Atlantic.”229  This result will follow in part from the development of a 
common lexicon which can be leveraged in assessing the policies developed 
by covered entities.230  Formalizing collaboration would support better 
policy by adding structure and sustainability to the process.  This would 
promote shared learning as all three bodies apply cybersecurity principles in 
new contexts.231  Such an arrangement could “improve 
communication/collective thinking and avoid missed opportunities to 
develop and coordinate . . . new policies.”232  Further, collaboration 
contributes to identifying and promoting baseline protections within the 
financial sector.233  Cooperation in this area could contribute to improved 
cybersecurity and resiliency for the entire financial infrastructure.234 
Collaboration will create benefits by limiting the degree of divergence 
between legal regimes.235  Failing to align the requirements where possible 
results in unnecessary additional work streams that achieve compliance, but 
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little else.236  Collaborating would minimize these unnecessary work streams 
and curb the additional compliance costs for companies operating in all three 
jurisdictions.237  This would be especially beneficial for smaller entities that 
are already struggling with thinner margins, and it would potentially allow 
them to remain independent.238  While it may seem like collaboration would 
only reduce these costs incrementally, it is important to remember the 
magnitude of foreign investment between the United States and the EU, 
which totaled $4.2 trillion in 2014.239  The large amount of investment and 
close economic relationship between the United States and the EU would 
magnify even incremental cost reductions. 
Despite differences in the way data protection is approached in the United 
States and the EU,240 similarities in values and goals “provide[] common 
ground on which to build practical solutions.”241  The SEC, NYDFS, and EU 
all engage in various forms of international cooperation in the interest of 
furthering their regulatory goals.242  A number of collaborative tools could 
be utilized by the three bodies to harmonize their regulatory schemes in areas 
where common goals are shared.243  These include dialogues,244 memoranda 
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https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2013-131 [https://perma.cc/3PBD-UY7K]; N.Y. 
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activity.”). 
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of understanding,245 nonbinding policy agreements,246 and endorsing 
nonbinding technical standards.247 
B.  Applying the Benefits and Mechanisms to Requirements 
This Part focuses on the benefits particular to the common requirements 
specified in Part II.  It also explores how collaborative tools could be used to 
harmonize these areas.  The purpose is to show how collaboration could 
operate, and the concrete benefits that such collaboration would create. 
1.  Breaking Down Data-Classification Barriers 
Data classification is a critical first step underlying many of the 
requirements or expectations enunciated by all three bodies.248  Performing 
that step provides a better understanding of what risks companies face based 
on their industry and infrastructure.249  However, performing such an 
inventory can be complicated, complex, and resource intensive.250  Given the 
need to perform some type of data-classification analysis to comply with all 
three regulatory regimes and the inevitable expense of doing so, cooperation 
between the three bodies to provide additional guidance in this area would 
be valuable. 
In the United States, the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (the “NIST 
Framework”) is a useful tool that provides guidance on how this step could 
be carried out.  The NIST Framework recommends the performance of core 
functions, one of which is to “Identify.”251  This function requires the 
identification of a number of factors that are divided into categories that are 
relevant to assessing an organization’s posture and risks.252  Two 
 
 245. PRIVACY BRIDGES, supra note 21, at 5 (proposing that ties should be strengthened 
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Assessment; and Risk Management Strategy.”). 
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subcategories are relevant to performing a data classification.253  The first is 
mapping the organization and data flows and the second is prioritizing 
resources, including data, based on their “classification, criticality, and 
business value.”254  The NIST Framework does not mandate a specific 
methodology for carrying this task out and instead provides informative 
references.255  These references are from a variety of organizations that offer 
detailed recommendations for how to carry out these tasks. 
Since the NIST Framework already exists and financial institutions have 
already “designed their cybersecurity programs to implement the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework,”256 it would facilitate cohesion and mitigate 
duplicative efforts if data classification recommendations were based in part 
on the existing practices recommended by the NIST Framework.  The three 
bodies could simply evaluate the recommendations made by the 
organizations the NIST Framework includes as informative references.  
Through dialogues, the three bodies could agree on which recommendations 
best accomplish common goals and publish a common list for use by the 
covered entities.  Additional recommendations from other organizations 
could be included if agreed upon, but it would be ideal if some of the NIST 
Framework recommendations were included since they have already been 
widely implemented.  It would also be helpful if explanations were provided 
regarding why certain recommendations were selected, as it could provide 
insight that would allow covered entities to adopt them in a more targeted 
manner.  These would likely have to take the form of nonbinding policy 
guidance.  However, agreement in this area would provide valuable guidance 
to covered entities regarding a critically important step that can potentially 
be very costly. 
2.  Writing the Playbook 
The separate written policy requirements should be streamlined through 
consensus among the three bodies in order to create a single cohesive process 
and resultant document.  Covered entities often have difficulty harmonizing 
the various requirements created by different regulatory regimes.257  The 
complexity of the different requirements creates unnecessary financial costs 
in the form of time and resources spent on repetitive actions.258  An approach 
that combines as many of the common steps and requirements as possible 
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reduces these costs, saves time, and limits duplicative efforts.259  Private 
sector companies offer products that are marketed as solutions to this 
problem; however, these products can be costly, especially for smaller 
entities.260  And independently performing the analysis to create such a 
process also requires time and effort, which translates to financial costs.261 
All three regulatory regimes require a written policy.262  The elements they 
have identified as relevant to an acceptable written policy are largely similar 
and include such things as technical measures, monitoring mechanisms, 
access controls, training programs, and incident response plans.263  The three 
bodies could maintain flexibility while still providing valuable guidance in 
the form of unofficial guidelines for creating a written policy.  This could be 
relatively general and simply identify all of the elements that they would like 
the entity to consider in formulating the policy and identifying which 
regulation or regulations that element pertains to.  This would help the 
covered entities adequately consider each element, identify which regulation 
requires it, and determine whether they are compliant. 
Currently, the guidance in this area is either lacking or so general it 
essentially quotes from the regulation.264  It would be beneficial if the three 
bodies produced a document similar to the Security Series promulgated by 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.265  In those documents, 
the relevant requirements are broken down into elements and questions for 
the covered entities to consider in formulating their policies and 
procedures.266  They also identify what is required and what is optional.267  
Alternatively, some private sector organizations provide free templates 
outlining factors to consider in formulating different elements of a security 
policy.268  Either of these types of document would be valuable to covered 
entities pursuing compliance. 
The three bodies could engage in dialogues aimed at drafting such a 
document, or series of documents, and publish nonbinding guidelines 
according to their relevant statutes and authorities.  This is desirable because 
the entities are best situated to identify and explain what they expect.  Further, 
the discussions that would be necessary to create such a document would 
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help develop and share best practices and improve overall understanding of 
threats.269  Finally, providing such a document would provide a more 
manageable and affordable path to compliance for all entities—particularly 
smaller ones that cannot afford to purchase private sector products that 
perform this analysis or perform it independently.  Given the magnitude of 
the economic relationships, and the significance of financial institutions 
within those relationships, the impact of such a collaborative product would 
be far-reaching and should result in substantial economic benefits. 
3.  Decrypting Encryption 
Encryption is another area where collaborative guidance could be 
beneficial.  It is unclear precisely how encryption should be implemented to 
satisfy each set of regulations.  A number of benefits would follow if 
common standards for encryption were established or endorsed by the 
regulatory bodies.270  For example, standards would allow covered entities 
to shop for the most cost-effective product for their specific needs.271  
Standards also homogenize the level of security, so that individuals can 
implement approved cryptographic algorithms and key lengths and know the 
encryption is adequate.272  In addition, standards contribute to the quality of 
products, by, for example specifying how features are implemented and 
requiring maintenance procedures to test whether the product continues to 
function correctly.273  Finally, standards create common specifications that 
can also help limit knowledge and compatibility costs.274 
The three bodies could approach this issue by engaging in a joint dialogue 
to identify the minimum standards they believe are necessary.  Areas that 
could be addressed include algorithm strength, key length, and best practices 
for key management.  As discussed above, algorithm strength can weaken 
over time,275 which is why such dialogues should be ongoing.  That way, any 
products of such dialogues can be updated or modified as circumstances 
require.  Consensus guidance could be promulgated by each body using an 
appropriate vehicle according to the requirements and limitations of their 
statutory authority, keeping in mind that encryption is subject to change. 
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As an alternative to defining standards themselves and revisiting them 
periodically, the bodies could identify organizations that promulgate 
encryption standards that meet their agreed criteria.  Such criteria could 
include how often the standards organizations update their policies, what 
level of security the standards they recommend provide, and how widely 
those standards have been deployed.  The three bodies could identify specific 
encryption standards based on similar criteria if they preferred.  An additional 
benefit of this method is that there are organizations that certify the 
implementation of many of these standards.  If the three bodies endorsed or 
certified these standards and organizations, covered entities would be able to 
more easily demonstrate an adequate implementation of encryption.  It would 
also allow the regulatory bodies to more easily identify covered entities that 
meet their minimum standards. 
CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, there is no way to prevent all intrusions and cyber incidents 
from occurring.  Therefore, the question is how resources should be allocated 
in a reasonable way to limit risk, mitigate damage, and protect consumers.  
Regulations are based on the judgments each regulatory body has made about 
the costs and benefits of sometimes competing values, reflecting the 
preferences of their constituencies.  There will remain numerous areas where 
the regulations cannot be easily harmonized.  But by identifying and working 
toward a consensus in the areas that can be harmonized, it is possible to 
shrink the areas of difference. 
Doing as much as possible to weave the patchwork of regulations that 
currently exists into a cohesive set of practices would benefit every 
stakeholder.  With reasonably consistent and clear paths to compliance, 
covered entities will be able to focus on implementing best practices, instead 
of identifying requirements.  This will both lower the cost and improve the 
implementation of the practices established by the SEC, NYDFS, and EU.  
Consumers would be able to enjoy the protection contemplated by the 
regulations at the lowest cost.  These three regulatory bodies can collaborate, 
using their expertise and resources to provide this guidance.  This would 
more effectively mitigate the negative effects of cyber incidents, protect both 
the industries and consumers they oversee, and further the policies that they 
are statutorily charged with implementing. 
 
